has most severely impacted Muslim students because it prohibits Muslim schoolgirls from wearing headscarves to school. finding that, although it infringed on the "freedom of thought, conscience, and religion," the restriction "was proportionate to the general interest pursued [-] respect for the principle of secularism in public schools. 28 Prior to this decision, an investigative commission 29 examined the necessity of the law and determined that France needed to take action against religious symbols in public schools for three reasons: (1) "wearing an ostensibly religious symbol.. . suffices to disrupt the tranquility of the life of the school"; 30 (2) headscarves threaten public order as it is too difficult for teachers and local officials to distinguish "illicit ostentatious symbols" from "licit non-ostentatious ones"; 3 '
and (3) headscarves threaten public order due to their association with communitarianism. 32 Five years later, French President Nicolas Sarkozy began campaigning for 23 . Loi 2004-228 du 15 mars 2004 encadrant, en application du principe de la'fcit&, le port de signes ou de tenues manifestant une appartenance religieuse dans les dcoles, collges et lyc~es publics [Law No. 2004 a stricter law on religious expression. 33 He argued that such a law is necessary to uphold France's values and secular ways, viewing the burqa as a sign of subservience rather than an expression of religious beliefs. 34 Advocating for the new law, President Sarkozy bluntly stated: "[The burqa] will not be welcome on the territory of the French republic. 35 Similarly, French Immigration Minister Eric Besson stated that he wanted "the wearing of the full veil to be systematically considered as proof of insufficient integration into French society, creating an obstacle to gaining (French) nationality. 36 These desires were realized in 2010, when the prohibition created by Law No. 2004-22831 was broadened by a law that banned the burqa and other full-face veils in all public places. 38 Both the French Assembly and the French Senate overwhelmingly passed the ban, 39 which was ultimately approved by the Constitutional Council, France's top legal authority, on October 7, 2010.40 The law went into effect on April 11,2011.41
Unlike Law No. 2004-228, which restricts religious garments only in public schools, 42 the new French law bans full-face veils in nearly all public places, including streets, markets, private businesses, entertainment venues, government buildings, and public transportation, but excluding public places of worship. 43 Any woman caught wearing a face-covering veil is subject to a 150 33 individual is a minor. Although the new law does not single out Islam on its face, in practice, the burqa ban is tailored to affect the Muslim population. The law constitutes a "restriction of a practice adopted only by women associated with a particular religion with the effect of impairing their enjoyment of fundamental rights. ' " 6 It is estimated that only 2,000 women in France actually wear the burqa 4 7 -an insignificant number given France has an estimated Muslim population of five to six million. 48 Thus, the law is more symbolic than practical; 49 it "exploits a non-problem.., and panders to anti-Muslim sentiment ....
The French government has justified the law's effect on the free exercise of religion by stating: "Given the damage [the full-face veil] produces on those rules which allow the life in community, ensure the dignity of the person and equality between sexes, this practice, even if it is voluntary, cannot be tolerated in any public place."
51 But it appears that France's discriminatory tendencies underlie the new burqa ban. france-burqa-ban-rachid-nekkaz. French-Algerian businessman Rachid Nekkaz has created a lobby group, "Hands off my Constitution," and a one million euro fund to pay any fines and unauthorized demonstration rather than for wearing the burqa. 54 Regarding this incident, the Deputy General-Secretary of the Union of Senior Police Officers admitted, "The law is going to be immensely difficult to apply and will be applied in a small way." 55 In a separate incident, a French woman due in court for violating the burqa ban was denied entry into her hearing because she refused to remove her burqa. 56 Because police are prohibited from removing the veils themselves, 57 the woman was told to leave the court, and her court appearance was abandoned. 58 Another woman due in court for the same reason simply stayed home, having been told she would be unable to gain entry into the court. 59 The burqa ban's implementation challenges continue as on December 13, 2011, a woman was again denied entry into court for her hearing because she was wearing a burqa; however, the court sentenced her to fifteen days of "citizen service" and ruled that failure to comply will result in up to a two year prison sentence and a 30,000 euro fine. 60 
III. BACKGROUND

A. Secularism in France
The French concept of secularism (laicite') 6 74 Although she regularly wore the Muslim headscarf, Ms. Mabchour indicated that she began the practice at her husband's insistence and continued it due to habit rather than overlying conviction. 75 But the French authorities viewed this religious practice as her insistence not to assimilate. 76 The Conseil d'Etat upheld the decision to deny Ms. Machbour citizenship, finding the ruling necessary because she had "adopted a radical practice of her religion, incompatible with the essential values of the French community, and particularly with the principle of sexual equality., 77 Ms. Machbour's case shows not only the French view on Islamic garments but also France's willingness, in the name of laicit, to require assimilation to the point of 78 refusing citizenship because of religious expression.
B. The French Muslim Population
Muslim immigration to France began to increase during the period following World War 11. 79 Faced with a labor shortage, France looked to its former colonies of Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia for a supply of workers. 80 Although France's secular laws prevent the government from keeping statistics on the religious affiliation of the French population, 8 ' the current Muslim population in France is estimated at five to six million. 82 Notably, France is home to Europe's largest Muslim population, and following Catholicism, Islam is the country's second largest religion. 83 Despite France's relatively large Muslim population, a majority of which are French citizens, French Muslims face extreme discrimination in the areas of housing, employment, education, and political participation. 84 The French-Muslim community has been characterized as "vulnerable" and a "target group. 85 Upon their arrival in France, poor immigrants of certain ethnic or religious backgrounds are segregated from the general French population by consistently being "allocated the poorest housing in specific neighbourhoods., 86 These neighborhoods are located outside of major cities and mainly consist of 87 run-down, economically depressed high-rise apartment blocks. It is estimated that one-third of France's Muslim population lives in such suppressed housing.
88
Employment discrimination is another obstacle facing French-Muslims. A survey measuring employment discrimination found that "four out of five employers preferred ancestral French workers" over those with minority backgrounds and that only I 1% of French employers satisfied equal treatment standards during the employee recruitment process. 89 Another study, specifically investigating Muslim employment discrimination, sent fictitious rdsum6s to a French employment agency and found that r~sum~s with white French names received a 25% to 30% positive response rate while that of the same rdsums sent using Arab-sounding names was only 5%. 90 Employment discrimination fuels high unemployment rates for Muslims and other minority groups, 9 ' making it hard for these groups to leave the poor neighborhoods. 92 Further, the inability to leave such housing tends to unite blamed the state for the teens' deaths, and major civil unrest followed. 9 7 Violent riots raged for three weeks in areas largely populated by Muslim immigrants.
98
In response, then-Interior Minister Nicolas Sarkozy vowed to "clean the [cities]" and "get rid of the rabble," causing even more outrage throughout the Muslim community. 99 France thereafter issued a national state of emergency. 0 0 It is estimated that, as a result of the riots, 10,000 cars were burned, 300 buildings were damaged, 220 police officers were injured, and over 6,000 people were arrested. 1 0 ' Commenting on the riots, then-French President Jacques Chirac emphasized that "discrimination must be fought, but order must be restored, as well."' 0 2
Although the deaths of the two teens triggered the riots, "nobody doubts that the real roots of the trouble [lay] 
IV. FRANCE'S HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS
Human rights are equally inherent to all individuals regardless of "nationality, place of residence, sex, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, language, or any other status." ' 1 17 They are also "interrelated, interdependent and indivisible." Islamophobia." Id. must "narrowly interpret" any interference with these rights.
EUMC, Muslims in the European
14 3 Such interpretation is necessary for the existence of religious pluralism, which is a characteristic inherent to a democratic society.144 Understanding the ECHR's method of deciding cases is important because, although it has upheld bans on Islamic headscarves in the past, the cultural landscape in Europe has since changed.1 45 For this reason, the ECHR should interpret the European Convention differently with regard to new cases dealing with religious freedom and Islamic headscarves.
B. Freedom of Religion under Article 9 of the European Convention
An ECHR determination on the validity of the French burqa ban will likely be based on the Court's application and interpretation of Article 9 of the European Convention 146 Article 9 provides:
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance. 147 2. Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.148
Thus, citizens of Member States have the right to freedom of religion under Article 9, but the right to manifest religious beliefs may be restricted under certain circumstances. 1 49 Because the status and treatment of the European Convention within a state's legal system may differ from state to state, the ECHR established the "margin of appreciation" doctrine as a tool to help determine whether an infringement on the rights guaranteed under Article 9 is warranted. 50 Some commentators criticize the margin of appreciation doctrine as a way for the ECHR to avoid its responsibility to enforce the European Convention.
158
Others argue that the extent to which the Court relies on the doctrine is no longer necessary, as Member States today are much more uniform with regard to democracy and civil liberties than they were when the margin of appreciation doctrine was created.
159 Regardless, the ECHR will apply some margin of appreciation to France if the Court rules on the French burqa ban. This Note argues that, because the burqa ban implicates the fundamental human right to freedom of religion, France's margin of appreciation should be narrow. 1 60 As set forth above, the right to manifest religious expression is not absolute and may be restricted under Article 9(2) if that restriction is (1) "prescribed by law," (2) corresponds to a legitimate state aim, and (3) is "necessary in a democratic society.' 61 This Note concedes that the first two elements pose no obstacle to the French burqa ban. A restriction is "prescribed by law" if the state law in question is simply "accessible to the individual and expressed with sufficient detail to enable the petitioner to adjust his conduct ' 1 63 France will likely justify the burqa ban's human rights interference by re-contextualizing it within the legitimate state aim of upholding secularism. The third element under Article 9(2) presents a greater challenge. In order for a limitation of an individual right to be "necessary in a democratic society," the limitation must relate to a "pressing social need" and be "proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued."' 64 In this regard, the ECHR balances "the severity of the restriction placed upon the individual against the public interest in question ....
However, problems arise in the application of this balancing test because it is vague 166 and because the Court has not determined an ideal standard for deciding whether the interests at issue in a given case are equitably balanced.
1 67 At times, the Court has required that the limitation on the right be the least restrictive means by which the countervailing public interest can be accomplished.
68 At other times, the Court has required that the limitation only meet a rational basis test, meaning that the limitation need only have a reasonable relationship to the legitimate public interest objectives. 16 
1
Nonetheless, the Court's goal in balancing these interests is to protect individual rights and prevent disproportionate state action against these rights in the name of public policy. 170 Therefore, this balancing test may be seen as a mechanism to prevent abuse of the margin of appreciation doctrine.1 7 '
V. ECHR CASE LAW
A. ECHR Cases that Have Found Article 9 Interference
The ECHR did not hear its first On application to the ECHR, the Court held that the Greek law violated Article 9 of the European Convention, finding it to be not proportionate to the legitimate aim of protecting the rights and freedoms of others and not "necessary in a democratic society."' 7 6 In so holding, the Court expressed for the first time that the right of freedom to manifest one's religion can be exercised "in public," with those sharing the same faith, as well as in private.' 7 7 The Court also recognized, however, that it may be necessary to limit this right in order to "reconcile the interests of . . . various groups and ensure that everyone's beliefs are respected" in contexts where the population maintains a variety of religious beliefs. 1 7 8
The ECHR similarly found an Article 9 violation in the 2010 case of AhmetArslan v. Turkey. 1 79 There, members of a religious group, the Aczimendi tarikaty, had gathered at a mosque for worship, and in accordance with the group's religious beliefs, walked in public wearing turbans and other distinctive religious garments.18 0 The members were arrested and convicted for breaching Turkey's headgear law as well as Turkey's law that prohibited the wearing of religious garments in public.' 8 ' The ECHR recognized there was a legitimate aim for interfering with the right of freedom to manifest one's religion, especially given that Turkey is a secular nation. 82 However, the Court found that the interest of secularism was not furthered by interfering with this group's religious dress and practices because the members were merely wearing their religious clothing in public. 183 The Court reasoned that the manifestation of religious beliefs in public rather than in state institutions does not garner the concern that the religious manifestation will influence others and violate state neutrality. 
B. ECHR Cases that Have Dealt with the Islamic Garment Issue under Article 9 1. Dahlab v. Switzerland
The ECHR case of Dahlab v. Switzerland dealt specifically with the use of the Islamic headscarf under Article 9 of the European Convention.' 8 5 This case concerned a Swiss primary school teacher, Lucia Dahlab, who wore the Islamic headscarf while teaching.1 86 Ms. Dahlab was forced to stop wearing the garment while at work because the practice was incompatible with Switzerland's Public Education Act requiring that "the political and religious beliefs of pupils and parents are respected.
1 87 The Court found no Article 9 violation, reasoning that the interference with Ms. Dahlab's Article 9 right was "necessary in a democratic society" and proportionate to the legitimate aim of "protecting the rights and freedoms of others, public order and public safety." 1 88 Specifically, the Court concluded that Ms. Dahlab's right to manifest her religion was outweighed by the need to protect students.
1 89 The ECHR emphasized that Ms. Dahlab was in a position of influence over her students, which presented a particular concern for the impact "a powerful external symbol such as the wearing of a headscarf may have on the freedom of conscience and religion of very young children." 190 The Court also expressed concern over the Islamic headscarf' s impact on the principle of gender equality. 1 91 Noting that the garment is often imposed on women, the Court reasoned it was "difficult to reconcile the wearing of an Islamic headscarf with the message of tolerance, respect for others and, above all, equality and nondiscrimination that all teachers in a democratic society must convey to their pupils. and from attending lectures pursuant to the Turkish headscarf ban, 197 and she brought suit alleging that the ban violated her right to "manifest her religion" under Article 9 of the European Convention.! 9 8 After taking into consideration Turkey's margin of appreciation in the matter, 99 the ECHR held that, although the ban interfered with $ahin's Article 9 rights, the interference was "justified in principle and proportionate to the aim pursued., 2 00 Specifically, the ECHR found that the Turkish ban pursued the legitimate aim of "protecting the rights and freedoms of others and of protecting public order.
' 20 1 The ;ahin Court focused most of its analysis on the issue of whether the ban was "necessary in a democratic society.
'2 0 2 In making its determination, the ECHR considered that the Article 9 values represented of freedom of thought, conscience, and religion help make up the foundation of a "democratic society.
' , 2 0 3 In addition, the Court acknowledged that the right of freedom to manifest one's religion can be exercised individually, in public, and in community with others, but that the right is not absolute under Article 9(2).20 4 The ECHR concluded that limitations of this right are especially relevant when a country has a diverse political demographic because such restrictions help to ensure that all religious interests are considered and respected.
20 5 But the Court added that "democracy does not simply mean that the views of a majority must always prevail: a balance must be achieved which ensures the fair and proper treatment of people from minorities and avoids any abuse of a dominant position.' 20 6
Regarding the headscarf issue in 5'ahin, the ECHR reasoned that because the Islamic headscarf is treated differently across Europe, the Court must give a relatively wide margin of appreciation to a state when such issues are being reviewed.
20 7 Context will determine the meaning or impact of an expression of religious belief, whether it be the wearing of an Islamic garment or some other form of religious expression. 2 0 8 Therefore, rules regarding Article 9 will differ from state to state according to the respective state customs and way of life.
2 0 9
The rules will also depend on the requirements necessary for a state to protect its citizens' rights and freedoms and to maintain public order.
The ECHR justified the Islamic headscarf ban in 5ahin on grounds of secularism and equality, 2 11 emphasizing that Turkey is a secular and predominantly Muslim state. 21 2 Because of Turkey's demographic, the Islamic headscarf is a highly influential symbol that the Court feared could be "presented or perceived as a compulsory religious duty," thereby pressuring those not wearing a headscarf into doing so. 213 In addition, the Court emphasized that the headscarf is a symbol that has gained political significance in Turkey over the years, which does not coincide with the principle of secularism. 214 The Court recognized Turkey's concern about extreme political movements looking to "impose on society as a whole their religious symbols and conception of a society founded on religious precepts., 2 15 Thus, the Court acknowledged that Turkey views the Islamic headscarf as a symbol of political Islam, not just that of individual liberty. 2 16 Also, given the law's educational context, the Court found that the Islamic headscarf did not coincide with the values of "pluralism, respect for the rights of others and, in particular, equality before the law of men and women. A dissenting opinion was issued in 5ahin by Judge Tulkens, who viewed the Islamic headscarf not only as a "local" issue but also as an issue facing Europe as a whole. 21 8 Consequently, the ECHR cannot rely on the margin of appreciation doctrine to ensure that the states are upholding the European Convention. 21 9 Instead of weighing the principles of secularism, equality, and liberty against one another, the majority opinion should have harmonized those principles. 220 The Court should have concentrated on the fact that Sahin did not wear her headscarf in an "ostentatious or aggressive" manner or use it to "provoke a reaction, to proselytise or to spread propaganda and undermine... to a minority or may be viewed as offensive to some. The dissent also addressed the concern of Islamophobia and how such discrimination can adversely affect the human rights of Muslims. 224 The Muslim headscarf is not an indicator of radical Islam, and one who wears a Muslim garment is not automatically one who seeks to impose such a religious symbol on the public in general. 225 Further, there was no reason to categorize $ahin as an extremist. 226 The practice of wearing an Islamic garment is one that 227 is utilized for various reasons-it does not carry with it a single meaning. Further, the dissent did not view the headscarf as an automatic representation of a woman's submission to a man. Instead, the dissent emphasized that, because Muslim women, often wear an Islamic garment as a freely chosen expression of their religious beliefs, 228 the headscarf at times can "be a means of emancipating women., 229 Thus, the majority's gender equality justification for the law was ironic because the implementation of the ban meant that $ahin was prevented from participating in a practice she freely adopted.
2 30 Moreover, it is beyond the role of the Court to make a "unilateral and negative" depiction of a religion or religious practice, to "determine in a general and abstract way" the significance of the Muslim headscarf, or to impose its viewpoint on $ahin.
2 3 ' Summarily, in arguing that the Turkish ban was not "necessary in a democratic society," the dissent considered the opinions of Muslim women and showed that there is another side to the burqa debate, a side that the $ahin majority ignored. concedes that the burqa ban is "prescribed by law" and pursues France's "legitimate aim" of upholding its secular identity; 235 however, the ECHR should strike down the burqa ban on the ground that it is not "necessary in a democratic society.
' ' 1 3 6 While the Court, rightly or wrongly, has upheld restrictions on the wearing of Muslim headscarves because the laws were found "necessary,, 237 there are several reasons that will require the ECHR to treat the French burqa ban differently.
A. The French Burqa Ban is Distinguishable from Prior ECHR Case-Law
The French burqa ban is distinguishable from cases where the ECHR has held that an Article 9 limitation was "necessary in a democratic society." Therefore, much of the Court's reasoning in prior Article 9 cases is inapplicable to the current situation in France. First, and rather importantly, the French burqa ban and the Turkish headscarf ban in $ahin take place in notably different political and social contexts. 238 Islam is the predominant religion in Turkey; 99.8% of the Turkish population is Muslim. 239 Also, Islamic extremism is a legitimate concern in Turkey, where the government fears that such movements have the potential to interfere with the country's recent democratic 240 progression. In contrast, only a minority of France's population is Muslim, and according to the French ambassador to Pakistan, "there is no home-grown terrorism in France. 24 Muslims actually wear the burqa, there is no concern that those who wear it will unduly influence Muslim women who do not. 2 47 Although the Turkish ban on headscarves in $ahin was also tailored to affect Muslims, that ban did not discriminate against minorities. "In Turkey, Muslim women wearing headscarves are not 'others.' They are perhaps the wives, mothers, and daughters of the legislators .
,, 248 Because most of Turkey's population is Muslim, there was a legitimate concern that allowing the headscarf in schools may pressure women who do not wear the garment into doing SO.
49
The ECHR has stated that, under its case law, "the right to freedom of religion as guaranteed under the Convention excludes any discretion on the part of the State to determine whether religious beliefs or the means used to express such beliefs are legitimate., 250 However, considering that French Muslims have historically faced discrimination, especially in the areas of housing and employment, 251 it appears that France is using the burqa ban to do just that.
France is exploiting its discretion against a minority population in order to dictate that Islam is neither a legitimate nor a welcome religion in France.
252
According to the ECHR, the French government may not abuse its dominant position; rather, it must guarantee the "fair and proper treatment of people from minorities. 2 53 Instead of treating the Muslim population of France fairly and properly, the French burqa adversely affects this population by imposing on them the state's beliefs. The ECHR has not allowed a restriction of human 254 rights merely because some may find a religion and its practices offensive. While the Muslim headscarf ban in $ahin does not discriminate against a minority, the burqa ban in France does, and this minority population relies on the ECHR to protect its human rights.
Additionally, the French burqa ban is distinguishable from prior ECHR case law because the scope of the law is, for the first time, all encompassing. 255 In ahin and Dahlab the headscarf was banned only in certain education 216 institutions. In contrast, the new French law prevents women from exercising their right to wear the garment in nearly all public spaces; it restricts teachers and students as well as women who wish merely to take a walk outside. Thus, the burqa ban is a more serious infringement on the right to religious freedom under Article 9 than the ECHR has previously considered. Further, in Dahlab and 5ahin, the potential impact of the burqa on students was a cause for concern and a factor that led the ECHR to uphold the Article 9 infringements.258 This factor was of particular importance in Dahlab, where the headscarf was worn by a teacher who held a position of influence over her young students and was responsible for instilling democratic values in the children. 259 The French burqa ban does not invoke comparably specific concerns.
The ECHR's holding in AhmetArslan, that the religious group members' Article 9 rights were violated because the group did not interfere with Turkey's secular interests by merely wearing their religious clothing in public, 260 hints that the ECHR may generally oppose broad public bans on religious clothing. 26 ' Indeed, since its decision in Kokkinakis, the ECHR has stated that Article 9 rights are exercisable "in public., 262 The French law's all encompassing ban of the burqa "constitutes an even more far reaching interference with religious freedom ... since it amounts to a state-imposed dress code applicable at all times. 263 Overall, the French law is sufficiently different from all prior Islamic garment laws ruled on by the ECHR, rendering the Court's rational for finding Article 9 limitations "necessary in a democratic society" in those cases unpersuasive and the French burqa ban unnecessary.
B. The French Burqa Ban is Disproportionate to Legitimate French Concerns
In addition to not being "necessary in a democratic society," the French 264 burqa ban is not "proportionate" to France's legitimate state concerns. Consequently, the law does not satisfy the "requirements for permissible interference with qualified rights" as established by the ECHR. 265 There are "less restrictive and potentially far more effective alternatives" to achieving France's goal behind the burqa ban, 266 whether that goal is to "promote gender equality, defend secular neutrality of the state (laicite) or ensure security, or any combination of the three., France's goal of promoting gender equality by protecting those women who are forced to wear the burqa does not legitimize the law's restriction on the right freedom of religion.
268 While many Muslim women are forced to wear a headscarf or burqa unwillingly "because of social pressure by family or even harassment by their peer group... others choose to wear it either on religious grounds, as an assertion of Muslim identity or as a culturally defined display of modesty., 269 By completely banning the burqa in public, France wrongly assumes that all women are forced to wear the garment. 270 Therefore the law is overbroad and will "inevitably conflict with the rights of those who make a conscious choice to veil themselves." 2 7 ' Moreover, the French burqa ban will likely have an adverse effect on gender equality because it puts women who wear the burqa in a no-win situation: either go out in public and risk state punishment or be restricted to their homes. 272 Such confinement denies these women access to many "services essential to the enjoyment of social and economic rights. 273 This is especially true for women who are forced to wear the burqa; confinement reduces their ability to seek advice on and refuge from their controlled situation. Thus, the burqa ban, promoted as a "measure designed to protect women against harassment and oppression[,] may well result in even greater confinement.
274
To deny women the right to wear a burqa under the guise of promoting gender equality when women themselves often choose to do so is ironic and ineffective. 275 "Equality and non-discrimination are subjective rights which must remain under the control of those who are entitled to benefit from them.
276
Unlike gender equality, French secularism and the protection of public morals are legitimate French concerns. But they are driven by public dissent to the burqa, which alone does not legitimize a full ban. 277 The ECHR has repeatedly found that "the right to freedom of expression includes forms of expression 'that offend, shock or disturb the state or any section of the population.' ' 278 Further, human rights law has clearly established that "the disquiet of one person cannot be used to justify a restriction on the freedom of 268 Security is another legitimate French concern, especially in situations where individuals must be identified, such as in airports, schools, and government buildings and proceedings. 28 But instead of completely banning the burqa to rectify these security concerns, the government could simply require that a woman be taken aside in order to show her face to a female employee. 282 This protocol is one way to "satisfy both the individual's right to manifest her religious beliefs and the duty to identify oneself. 283 Preventing radical behavior and terrorism is another legitimate security concern because the burqa is often associated with radical Islam in a world where radical Islam often invokes a fear of terrorism. However, "[e]quating conservative religious beliefs with violent radicalism is a mistake., 284 Women often wear the burqa for reasons not associated with radical Islam. 285 While France does have legitimate state concerns regarding the burqa, the burqa ban disproportionately addresses these concerns by completely curtailing Muslim women's right to freedom of religion, specifically the freedom to manifest one's religion. Because this freedom is a fundamental right, the burqa ban's interference must be "narrowly interpreted [.] " 286 The ECHR should find that the severity of the burqa ban's restriction outweighs its public interest justifications. While legitimate and important to some extent, France can combat its concerns in a manner that is less burdensome than a public ban on the garment. Thus, the ECHR should rule that the French burqa ban is disproportionate to the legitimate state concerns and constitutes a violation of Article 9.
C. The ECHR is Obligated to Uphold Human Rights
The burqa ban constitutes France's failure to uphold its human rights obligations under Article 9 of the European Convention. 287 289 This lack of enforcement power is precisely why the ECHR is among the most powerful treaty-based courts, 29°h aving the duty and ability to enforce the human rights obligations of the European Convention upon Member States.
29 ' This is also why the ECHR must fulfill its human rights obligations; States must in some way be held responsible for the human rights obligations they undertake.
The ECHR Must Interpret the European Convention as a Living Document
The ECHR has a duty to treat the European Convention as a "living instrument., 292 Therefore, in determining whether the French burqa ban interferes with human rights, the ECHR must interpret the European Convention in light of the present day conditions in France as well as across
293
Europe. Wilkinson argues that migrants are often used as scapegoats in difficult economic and political times such as the situation currently in Europe. Id. Because the media often portrays immigrants poorly, when in fact most are "economic, are working and paying taxes," it is argued that it is easy for migration easily can to become an "excuse for xenophobia and racism" and easy for the public to "confuse migrants with settled ethnic minorities." Id.
a. Present Day Conditions in France
[Vol. 22:1 threatened to kill French citizens. 3 15 The message stated: "If you want to tyrannize and think that it is your right to ban the free women from wearing the burqa, isn't it our right to expel your occupying forces, your men from our lands by striking them by the neck?", 316 Fear of extreme behavior and backlash from the burqa ban prompted France to raise its national terror alert to its second highest level after the French Senate passed the public burqa ban. 317 Similarly, terror threat information led the U.S. State Department to issue a travel alert to Americans in Europe in the fall of 2010, warning U.S. citizens "to be aware of their surroundings and protect themselves when traveling., 318 A security source stated that "[a] possible backlash from the French burqa ban [was] considered a factor in the... warning., 319 The various responses to the burqa ban show how controversial the law is and how the perception of the Muslim population can be negatively skewed by the actions of a small number of extremists. Overall, "views on the scarf ban [are] closely tied to overall attitudes toward Muslims, with those with negative views of Muslims far more inclined to embrace the ban than those with more positive views. 32°E urope's Muslim population is rapidly increasing, 32 1 and with it, Islam is becoming a more prevalent religion throughout Europe. 3 22 If the ECHR allows France to continue its burqa ban, it will be setting a dangerous precedent during this critical time in Europe. This could potentially lead to other European countries adopting similar bans, which in turn, would result in widespread human rights violations across Europe. The burqa ban's discriminatory and potentially precedential impact provide the ECHR with a "cogent reason" for straying away from its previous decisions. 
The ECHR 's Treatment of Islam is Suspect
The ECHR has often been criticized for its treatment of religious minorities-notably Muslims-and their Article 9 right to freedom of religion. 324 Although the ECHR was established in 1959, the Court did not accept an Article 9 case dealing with "new," "minority," or "nontraditional" religions until the 1993 Kokkinakis case. 325 And while the Court found an interference with religious freedom under Article 9 in that case, it failed to elaborate or define the scope of its decision or its obligations under Article 9.326 From this inaction it has been inferred that the ECHR does not view the right to 327 freedom of religion as one of utmost importance.
Further, the Court suggested in Kokkinakis that a witness lobbying for a Christian religion would be treated more favorably than a witness lobbying for a minority religion. 328 Because of this distinction, it has been argued that the ECHR favors mainstream over non-mainstream religions. 329 Additionally, it appears that the ECHR tends to downplay the influential impact of mainstream religious symbols (e.g., the crucifix) by interpreting them as representations of national culture and identity. 330 In contrast, the ECHR has consistently viewed minority religious symbols, in particular the Islamic headscarf and burqa, as symbols that are inconsistent with fundamental democratic values. 331 Even in ;ahin, where Islam was the majority religion, the Court applied the "margin of appreciation" doctrine to protect the non-Muslim minority. 332 Considering that the Court does not often rule for the protection of the minority religion, which is often Islam, this application of the doctrine is interesting. The ongoing question of whether Turkey will join the EU provides further insight into Europe's view of Islam. If Turkey is to be admitted as a Member State, it must show that it fits the mold of the West, 336 having the "stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities., 337 Significantly, the West views the Islamic headscarf and burqa as a sign of radical Islam. 3 38 And as noted earlier, the ECHR's decision to uphold the headscarf ban in 5ahin was justified in part on the ground that Turkey needed to prevent an uprising of radical Islam. 339 Turkey's mission against the Islamic headscarf may be viewed as an effort to reduce "Europe's distrust of Turkey's ability to 'control' its Muslim roots" and to create the perception of satisfying EU membership criteria. 340 But these efforts simultaneously restrict the human right to freedom of religion in an ironic violation of the EU membership requirement to uphold human rights. 34 ' Islamic garments have been viewed as a "symbolic enemy" of the EU, which was founded "on a common Christian heritage. 342 Further, while the EU has a motto of "unity in diversity," the EU's view on Islam, exemplified by the treatment of Islamic garments and Turkey's willingness to go to lengths to downplay its Muslim roots, can be said to show that the EU may be selective in what kind of diversity it chooses to accept. 343 This current political and religious background in Europe must be kept in mind as it may have some underlying impact on the ECHR's decisions regarding the right to freedom of religion.
In determining the validity of the French burqa ban, the ECHR should . 30,2010 ). An EU candidate country must also satisfy the following membership requirements: "the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union" and "the ability to take on the obligations of membership including adherence to the aims of political, economic & monetary union." Id.
338 347 Further, the dissent emphasized that Islamic garments do not carry a single meaning, and because some women voluntarily wear a headscarf or burqa, bans on such garments may in some ways diminish gender equality. 348 Additionally, the dissent reiterated the importance of protecting the Article 9 rights of minorities, even though their beliefs may be offensive to some.
349
The ECHR is obligated to overcome the anti-Islam bias that is present in Europe and to take action in order to protect the human rights of all European Convention member citizens-whether they be of a mainstream or minority religion. "Above all, the message that needs to be repeated over and over again is that the best means of preventing and combating fanaticism and extremism is to uphold human rights. 35°3 
. Europe's View on the Burqa
Europe's stance on the burqa coincides with its general stance on Islam. In 2010 the Pew Research Center surveyed France, Germany, Great Britain, Spain, and the United States regarding a ban on the full Islamic veil. 3 5 ' The results show that the French public has the most widespread support for the ban, with 82% of those polled in approval. 352 A majority of the people polled in the other Western European countries also supported the idea of a ban in their own countries, with 71% approval in Germany, 62% in Britain, and 59% in A similar Pew Institute study, conducted in 2005, regarding bans on Muslim headscarves reflected lower approval ratings. 355 Seventy-eight percent of those polled in France approved, with 54% in Germany, only 29% in Britain, and 43% in Spain. 356 This study also found that a majority of the Muslim women polled in Britain and Spain, and just under half of those in Germany, wear a headscarf or other garment that covers their heads every day or almost every day. 357 In contrast, 73% of Muslim women polled in France reported that they do not wear a Muslim head covering. 358 As noted above, it is estimated that only around two thousand women in France wear the burqa. 359 The burqa ban approval ratings listed above dangerously correlate with the dramatically increasing Muslim population throughout Europe. And because Muslim head coverings appear to be more prevalent in European countries other than France, it stands to reason that burqa bans in other European countries would result in the widespread denial of Muslim women's
